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RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC GROUNDS: Two
APPROACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution is one of the hallowed hallmarks of our democratic
form of government.' Indeed, although presently all democratic govern-
ments give some form of protection to expression, nowhere is the protec-
tion more fundamental or expansive than in the United States.2 Religious
expression in particular has found considerable protection in the form of
the First Amendment's two Religion Clauses.3 The Establishment Clause
provides that the government may not pass laws that establish a state
religion, while the Free Exercise Clause mandates that an individual's
right to freely practice her own faith may not be infringed upon by the
government.4
In the period covered by this survey, September 2001 to August
2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided two cases that substan-
tially involved the seminal First Amendment protections of speech and
religion. In Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 5 the court
had to determine whether or not a school district that was home to a hor-
rifying high school shooting was justified in refusing to include in a
school redecoration project certain decorative wall tiles because they
contained particular subject matter.6 In Summum v. City of Ogden,7 the
court considered whether a municipality had unconstitutionally infringed
upon a religious sect's First Amendment free speech rights when the
municipality refused to allow the sect to post a monument containing its
religious tenets on public property alongside an already-standing
"monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments."8
I. The First Amendment provides, in whole: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1998).
3. See Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1711
(2000) (stating that the First Amendment's Religion Clauses are "the principal constitutional protec-
tions for religious liberty and the separation of church and state in a nation characterized by religious
pluralism").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
5. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
6. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920, 922.
7. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
8. Summum, 297 F.3d at 997-98.
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Although both of these cases involved crucial questions concerning
the expression of religious messages within publicly-owned spaces, it is
significant that they were both decided on free speech grounds, and the
Establishment Clause was given little attention in their adjudication. This
survey examines this perceived inattention of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals to the issues arising from the Establishment Clause, and argues
that the cases represent two starkly divergent, yet equally salient, views
of the proper relationship between church and state. Part I of the survey
focuses on the Fleming case. It reviews the United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence dealing with free speech in public schools over the past
three decades, analyzes the Fleming decision itself, and then examines
decisions of other circuits in relation to the particular free speech issues
that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals faced in Fleming. Part II outlines
a general history of the case law concerning efforts to erect religious
monuments on public grounds, examines the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Summum, and reviews decisions of other circuits regarding similar legal
issues. Finally, Part HI provides an overview of the import that the Flem-
ing and Summum decisions may have for the issues of religious expres-
sion that face the country today.
I. FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND THE
TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN FLEMING V. JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT R-19
A. Student and Private Individual Speech in Public Schools-A Histori-
cal Perspective and Legal Framework
1. Beginnings: Tinker and Its Aftermath
The belief that the First Amendment protects student and other pri-
vate individual expression within the public school setting has not always
been commonly held, nor has it been applied with ease by the courts.' °
Indeed, until the 1970s, the general presumption and view was that
school authorities retained a superior right and interest in controlling
both curriculum content and student behavior that overrode the students'
rights to freedom of expression." This presumption in favor of the au-
thority of school districts to curtail student and private individual expres-
sion in the public schools, however, met with a resounding turnabout in
the landmark United States Supreme Court case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.12
9. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
10. Edward T. Ramey, Article, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of
Columbine, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 699 (2000).
11. David L. Dagley, Trends in Judicial Analysis Since Hazelwood: Expressive Rights in the
Public Schools, 123 EDUc. L. REP. 1, 2 (1998).
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see Dagley, supra note 11, at 4.
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In Tinker, a young woman and her brother wore black armbands to
their school to peacefully protest the United States military's presence in
Vietnam. 13 After refusing to remove the armbands, the students were sent
home by the school principal.' 4 The Court found that the school did not
have the right to infringe on the students' right to express their anti-war
beliefs, even if those beliefs were potentially controversial.15 As Justice
Fortas so famously articulated, "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."'
' 6
Although by no means conferring an absolute right of free expres-
sion on public school students, 7 Tinker stands for the proposition that
public school students and private individuals do have certain fundamen-
tal rights of free speech in the school setting that are constitutionally pro-
tected and that thus have to be respected.'8 The ruling was "the highwater
mark for public school students' First Amendment rights."' 9 Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, perhaps as a result of a shift towards a more
conservative ideology, began to carve out exceptions to the general rec-
ognition of students' rights of expression.20
One of these exceptions was first articulated in Bethel School Dis-
trict No. 403 v. Fraser. In that case, a high school student named Mat-
thew N. Fraser gave a speech nominating a fellow student for student
elective office at an assembly attended by 600 other students. 22 Through-
out the speech, Fraser incoiporated an explicit sexual metaphor into his
references to the candidate. The student reaction to the speech ran the
13. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
14. Id.
15. d.at 505-06, 513-14.
16. Id. at 506.
17. The Court announced a test based on the degree to which the expression interfered with
normal school activities, i.e. student conduct that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech." Id. at 513. Thus, any conduct that fell under this "substantial and
material disruption" umbrella would not be protected. See id.
18. See Ramey, supra note 10, at 702 ("[T]he rhetoric of Tinker was a manifestation of re-
spect for and confidence in our nation's young people. The Supreme Court case was a ringing re-
fusal to demean them as second-class citizens, or worse.").
19. Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992).
20. Ramey, supra note 10, at 702-03.
21. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
22. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 677.
23. Id. at 678. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan provided some of the text of Fra-
ser's speech:
I know a man who is firm--he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most.., of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman
is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it
to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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gamut from confusion and embarrassment to loud approval.24 Fraser was
subsequently suspended from school by the School District for three days
and his name was removed from a list of candidates for graduation
speaker at that year's commencement ceremony. 25 After he returned to
school, Fraser and his father, who was acting as guardian ad litem,
brought suit in federal district court alleging that the School District in-
26fringed upon Fraser's right to free speech under the First Amendment.
The district court ruled in favor of Fraser, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.27
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the School
District "acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanc-
tions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and indecent
speech.28 The Court said that schools have a duty to expand their influ-
ence beyond books and curriculum and to "teach by example the shared
values of a civilized social order., 29 According to the Court, the School
District's actions were appropriate because they showed the students that
"vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'funda-
mental values' of public school education., 30 Thus, in Bethel, the excep-
tion that allows public schools to control "speech that is lewd, indecent,
or offensive" was born.3'
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,32 the Court established
another exception to students' rights of free speech based on the notion
that in some instances schools sponsor, and thus adopt, certain speech.33
In that case, a principal directed a teacher to remove two student-written
articles from a high school newspaper.34 The Tenth Circuit applied this
exception in Fleming.35 This survey will, therefore, examine the Hazel-
wood decision in greater detail below.
2. Public Forum Analysis: Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass 'n
3 6
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n,37 is possi-
bly the most important Supreme Court case involving the public forum
24. Id. at 678.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 679.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 685.
29. Id. at 683,
30. Id. at 685-86.
31. Dagley, supra note 11, at 8.
32. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
33. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-73.
34. Id. at 262-64.
35. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923-26 (10th Cir. 2002).
36. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
37. 460 U.S. 37.
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doctrine. 38 In that case, a collective bargaining agreement between a
board of education and a teachers' union mandated that only that union,
and not a rival union, could use a school district's interschool mail deliv-
ery system. 39 A rival teachers' union was excluded from using the mail
system because under the collective bargaining agreement, it was not the
recognized bargaining agent for the district's teachers. 40 The rival union
consequently sued the school district and alleged that denying it access to
the mail system violated its free speech rights.4 '
The Supreme Court's analysis was based on the character of the fo-
rum in question.4 2 The Court separated the properties that fall under this
public forum doctrine into three different categories.43 Public fora are
public areas such as parks and streets "which 'have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions." '44 The government may not ban
all speech in these fora.45 The government can only implement a restric-
tive, content-based regulation when the "regulation is necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.46
At the other end of the public property spectrum is the nonpublic fo-
rum. 47 A nonpublic forum is one that is publicly owned but that has a
"governmental function other than the open and unfettered exchange of
ideas."" The government's power to regulate nonpublic fora is similar to
the power a private owner has to control his property.49 The government
may not only adopt reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and man-
ner of expression, but may also "reserve the forum for its intended pur-
poses, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view., 50 Nonpublic fora include
post offices, municipal buildings, and public schools.5 ' Thus, in a non-
public forum, the government retains its most expansive authority to
52
restrict expression on public premises.
38. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
39. Perry, 460 U.S. at 39.
40. Id. at 40-41.
41. Id. at41.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. at 44-46.
44. Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
51. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5-6.
52. See id.
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The third type of public property, the limited access public forum,
falls somewhere between these two other categories. 3 The limited access
public forum is a forum that was previously nonpublic but has been
opened by the government for the public to use in expressive activity.54
The government has affirmatively changed the character of these fora to
allow for the expressive activity. 55 The government may restrict expres-
sion in the same manner and to the same degree as a traditional public
forum.56 Restrictions on speech in limited access public fora based on
content are prohibited unless the restriction is "narrowly drawn to effec-
tuate a compelling state interest.,
57
The Perry Court ultimately ruled that the interschool mail system at
issue was a nonpublic forum. 58 Thus, the School District had the right to
limit the activities carried on through the system to those that comport
with the purpose the government selected for the property.59
Public forum analysis has become a very useful tool for analyzing
restrictions on free speech in the public school setting.60 In addition, the
test set forth in Perry has become "the governing standard for regulation
of speech on public property."'6' Accordingly, the public forum method
of analysis was the starting point for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in its adjudication of the dispute in Fleming.62 However, the crux of the
court's analysis ultimately depended upon the doctrines set forth in an-
other Supreme Court case that involved free speech in public schools.
3. The Hazelwood Standard: School-Sponsored Speech
The fundamental holding of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl-
meier63 is that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercis-
ing editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 64 In Hazelwood,
three student staff members of a high school newspaper sued a School
District because their school principal decided to excise two articles from
an issue before it was printed.65 One of the omitted articles was about the
experiences students had with teen pregnancy and the other about the
53. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
54. id. at 45.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 50-51.
60. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
61. FARBER, supra note 2, at 174.
62. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 929.
63. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
65. Id. at 262-64.
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impact of divorce on students at the school.66 The principal was con
cerned that the articles could harm the school's younger students. He
was also concerned that readers would be able to identify the students
referred to in the articles even though the authors used fictitious names.
68
In an opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court decided
that there was, as Professor Edward Ramey has put it, "an operative dis-
tinction between speech which a school must tolerate and speech which a
school must sponsor., 69 The Tinker decision mandates that schools must
abide most student speech that transpires on school premises. 70 However,
regarding school-sponsored speech, the Hazelwood court said:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not errone-
ously attributed to the school.
7 1
The Court's definition of school-sponsored speech was fairly ex-
pansive. 72 School-sponsored speech encompasses "school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school. 7 3 These are activities that the Court
asserted could "fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as
they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. 74 Thus, the
Hazelwood Court broadened the definition of curriculum to include any-
thing that someone might reasonably believe the school sponsored.7 5
Hazelwood placed greater limitations on students' rights of expres-
sion and deferred more to the educational aims and methods of school
officials than Tinker.7 6 This shift could be attributable to fall-out from the
rebellious student uprisings of the 1960s or to changes in the Court's
66. Id. at 263.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Ramey, supra note 10, at 706.
70. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
71. Id. at 271.
72. See Dagley, supra note 11, at 9.
73. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Dagley, supra note 11, at 9.
76. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL
327 (2000).
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makeup in recent years.77 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
Hazelwood and the expanded authority of school officials in Fleming.
78
B. Circuit Court Applications of the School-Sponsored Speech Exception
1. Tenth Circuit: Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1
79
a. Facts
On April 20, 1999, two students from Columbine High School, Eric
Harris and Dylan Klebold, entered the school and went on a shooting
rampage. 80 They killed twelve students and one faculty member. 8' The
shooters also took their own lives.82 The Jefferson County School Dis-
trict ("the District") decided to reopen the school the following fall.83 It
realized, however, that the "prospect of reintroducing students to the
[Columbine High School] building posed significant mental health chal-
lenges." 84 School officials were concerned that various "sensory clues"
85might remind students of the attack.
To help alleviate these concerns, Elizabeth Keating, the school li-
brarian, and Barbara Hirokawa, an art teacher, urged the District to con-
tinue an ongoing student art project that placed individually designed and
painted 4-inch-by-4-inch glazed tiles on the hallway walls throughout the
school. 86 After she consulted with various District administrators, the
area administrator who oversaw Columbine High, Barbara Monseu, gave
preliminary approval for Keating and Hirokawa to implement an ex-
panded version of the tile project.87 The District issued a press release
that gave two central reasons for the tile project.88 First, participating in
the tile project would give students the opportunity to become comfort-
able with their school surroundings again.89 In addition, students who
participated would play a part in reconstructing their school.90
In order to help the community heal, the District also asked mem-
bers of the victims' families, emergency workers who responded to the
incident, and health care professionals who cared for the wounded to
participate.91 Hundreds of individuals who were related to the shooting
77. Id.
78. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 929-34.
79. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).







87. Id. at 921.
88. Id. at 920.
89. Id. at 920-21.
90. Id. at 921.
91. Id.
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ultimately painted tiles.92 In order to better fulfill the aims of the project,
the District and Ms. Monseu issued guidelines for the tiles.93 These
guidelines were imposed primarily to "assure that the interior of the
building would remain a positive learning environment and not become a
memorial to the tragedy." 94 Participants were not to make any references
to the attack, the date the attack occurred, incorporate students' names or
initials, Columbine memorial ribbons, or religious symbols, or include
any material that was "obscene or offensive."
95
Teachers from Columbine High School informed the participants of
the guidelines and supervised the painting. 96 The plaintiffs objected to
the guidelines.97 These participants wished to paint tiles that included the
names of their lost loved ones and religious symbols.98 The supervising
faculty informed these participants that they were free to paint the tiles as
they wished, but if the tiles violated the guidelines, they would not be
used to decorate the walls and would instead be given back to the de-
signers for their personal use.99
The District ultimately removed eighty to ninety tiles that had es-
caped earlier review from the walls because they violated the guide-
lines.1°° In September 1999, Ms. Monseu met with some of the people
who had objected to the guidelines and agreed to relax some of the re-
strictions. 101 Participants were told that they could include the name and
initials of their children, dates other than April 20, and the Columbine
memorial ribbon.10 2 However, religious symbols, the date of the attack,
and offensive or obscene materials were still prohibited. 103
The plaintiffs were not satisfied with the relaxed standards. 1°4 They
filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, al-
leging that the District infringed upon their free speech rights and vio-
lated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 10 5 The district
court granted judgment for the plaintiffs on the free speech claim, and







98. Id. The Plaintiffs wished to include "Jesus Christ is Lord," "4/20/99 Jesus Wept," "There
is no peace says the Lord for the wicked," and signs of the cross in their designs. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 921-22.





106. Id. at 920 n. 1.
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The plaintiffs did not appeal the judgment against them on the Es-
tablishment Clause.10 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
address the issue, stating bluntly that "only the Free Speech Clause issue
[was] before [them]."'1 9 However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling on the free speech claim." 0 It diverged from the lower
court's central holding that the speech in question was not school-
sponsored speech."'
To elucidate the reasoning behind its reversal, the court began its
analysis by pointing out that "three main categories of speech ... occur
within the school setting."'" 2 Of the three, the court ruled that the tile
project was a nonpublic forum." 3 This issue was not really disputed,
however, because both "parties concede[d] that the tile project does not
constitute a traditional public forum or a designated public forum, and
[the court's] review of the record comport[ed] with this analysis."
'"14
Moreover, the District never opened the tile pro ject to "indiscriminate
use" by the general public or the participants."1  Thus, "[t]he level of
control that the District retained over the tile project" made the project a
nonpublic forum. 1
6
The district court ruled that the tiles were not school-sponsored
speech under Hazelwood. "17 According to the Tenth Circuit, the district
court concluded that in order to be school-sponsored speech, it had to
derive from "activities conducted as part of the school curriculum."'
18
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the district court had read Hazelwood too
narrowly.1 9 Instead, school-sponsored speech consists of "activities that
might reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school and
that involve pedagogical concerns."' 20 Speech bears the imprimatur of
the school if it is "so closely connected to the school that it appears the
school is somehow sponsoring the speech."' 21 In addition, "the level of
107. Id. at 920.
108. Id. at 920 n.1.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 934.
111. Id. at 923.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 929-30.
114. Id. at 929.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 929-30.
117. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (D. Colo. 2001).
118. Fleming, 298 F.3d 924 (quoting Fleming, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1108).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. d. at 925.
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involvement of school officials in organizing and supervising an event
affects whether that activity bears the school's imprimatur.",2 2The Tenth
Circuit stated that "expressive activities that the school allows to be inte-
grated permanently into the school environment and that students pass by
during the school day come much closer to reasonably bearing the im-
primatur of the school.' ' 23 The court defined pedagogical as "related to
learning. '' 124 The court noted that "[m]any cases have applied a Hazel-
wood analysis to activities outside the traditional classroom where, so
long as the imprimatur test is satisfied, the pedagogical test is satisfied
simply by the school district's desire to avoid controversy within a
school environment.,
125
The Hazelwood Court was not ambiguous about requiring greater
deference to school officials who are charged with educating the nation's
youth. 126 The Tenth Circuit followed this direction and gave
substantial deference to educators' stated pedagogical concerns. The
[Hazelwood] Court recognized that its articulated standard for
school-sponsored expression was 'consistent with [its] oft-expressed
view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the respon-
sibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and
not of federal judges.' 
127
The Tenth Circuit found that the tile project satisfied both prongs of
the test for school-sponsored speech. 28 The court's finding that the tiles
bore the imprimatur of the school was based on the belief that people
would imply that the school approved of them from the fact that they
were permanently attached to the walls. 129 Moreover, the significant level
of the school's involvement with the tile project strongly suggested that
the school had in some way approved of its content. 130 Finally, the court
dismissed the district court's argument that the tiles were all individually
painted by members of the surrounding community and not by school
officials:
No doubt the variety and number of tiles would lead an observer to
understand that the school itself did not paint the tiles. However, the




125. Id. at 925-26.
126. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 & n.7.
127. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
128. Id. at 931.
129. Id. at 930.
130. Id. ("When coupled with organizing, supervising, approving the funding, and screening
the tiles," the court wrote, "the school's decision permanently to mount them on the walls conveys a
level of approval of the message.").
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guidelines for, and ultimately approving, the tiles it allowed to be-
come a part of the school itself, which in this case, it did. 
131
The Tenth Circuit also found that the goal of the project implicated
legitimate pedagogical concerns. 32 According to the court, "[tihe pur-
pose of reacquainting the students with the school and participating in
community healing falls under the broad umbrella that courts have given
to pedagogical purposes."' 33 Furthermore, the fact that the tile project
involved people outside of the school's staff and student body didn't
diminish the project's pedagogical character. 134 "[S]o long as a peda-
gogical purpose is present," opined the court, "we do not believe that the
existence of broader and consistent objectives, such as community in-
volvement, should result in the loss of the proper pedagogical pur-
pose."'
135
In addition, the court found that the District's restriction of religious
content on the tiles was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns. 136 The District contended that the tiles containing religious mes-
sages had to be prohibited because 1) they might remind viewers of the
shooting, and 2) displaying them would make walls "a situs for religious
debate, which would be disruptive to the learning environment."'' 37 The
court clearly agreed with the District because it found that the ban "was
reasonably related to its legitimate goal of preventing disruptive religious
debate on the school's walls."'138 To buttress its holding, the court de-
scribed the absurd situations that might arise if the school did not have
the authority to restrict such expression. 139 Referring to its conclusion
that the District had the right to make decisions based on viewpoint or the
content of particular expression, the court stated:
If the District were required to be viewpoint neutral in this matter, the
District would be required to post tiles with inflammatory and divi-
sive statements, such as "God is Hate," once it allows tiles that say
"God is Love." When posed with such a choice, schools may very
well elect to not sponsor speech at all, thereby limiting speech instead
of increasing it. 140
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the circuit courts of appeals
were split about whether schools could impose viewpoint-based limita-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 931.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 931-32.
135. id. at 932.
136. Id. at 933, 934.
137. Id. at 933.
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tions on school-sponsored speech. 141 Significantly, the potential for the
plaintiffs to appeal this decision to the United States Supreme Court
ended in January 2003, when the Supreme Court denied a writ of certio-
rari and refused to hear the case. 142
2. Other Circuits
a. Eighth Circuit: Henerey v. Cily of St. Charles'
43
i. Facts
Adam Henerey, a sophomore at St. Charles High School in St.
Charles, Missouri, requested to run for junior class president. 144 In order
to run, each candidate had to meet with a student council advisor and
sign a contract of obligation where the candidate agreed to follow all
school rules, which Henerey signed. 145 Sometime later a member of the
student counsel told Henerey that campaign fliers and posters had to be
approved by the school administration before they were disseminated.'46
Henerey obtained the school's approval to use the campaign slogan,
"Adam Henerey, The Safe Choice."'147 On the day of election, he handed
out approximately eleven condoms attached to stickers containing his
campaign slogan in the School's hallways. 14 8 The School subsequently
disqualified Henerey from the election because he had not obtained the
School's approval to hand out condoms attached to the campaign stick-
ers.149 Henerey later sued, alleging that the School violated his free
speech rights. 50 The district court found that the student counsel election
occurred in a nonpublic forum and that disqualifying Henerey from the




The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the election took place in a nonpublic forum and that the student
campaign materials used in the election were school-sponsored speech. 1
52
The main issue for the court, then, was whether the School District's
141. Id. at 926 (discussing the split in circuits regarding the issue of content-based restrictions
of expression in the public school setting).
142. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 123 S. Ct. 893 (2003); Jim Hughes, U.S.
High Court Leaves Alone Ruling Against Tiles'Display, DENV. POST, Jan. 14, 2003, at 8A.
143. 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).








152. Id. at 1133.
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decision "was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' 53
On this point the court concurred with the district court's finding that the
decision was reasonable. 54 As the court explained, "School districts have
an interest in maintaining decorum and in preventing the creation of an
environment in which learning might be impeded, an interest that was
particularly strong in the present case because the condom distribution
occurred within the context of a school-sponsored election."1 55 implicit
in this view is the belief that educators have a right to preclude speech
based on a message's content.1 56 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment in favor of the City of St. Charles because the decision
to disqualify Henerey was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns, and because "Henerey's distribution of the condoms carried
with it the implied imprimatur of the school."
157
b. Ninth Circuit: Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada,
Inc. v. Clark County School District
58
i. Facts
Planned Parenthood, a nonprofit organization that offers family
planning and reproductive health education programs, submitted adver-
tisements to the school newspapers and athletic programs within a school
district ("the District") for publication. 159 The majority of the schools in
the District refused to publish the advertisements.160 As a result, Planned
Parenthood filed suit alleging that the District had infringed on the or-
ganization's right of free speech. 161 The district court ruled that the
school publications were nonpublic forums under Hazelwood and that
the District's decision to reject the advertisements in question was rea-
sonable. 162 Planned Parenthood appealed the ruling.
163
ii. Decision
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the publications
sponsored by the District's schools, including advertising pages, were
nonpublic fora, and, thus, the District could control what expression was
included.164 The court dismissed the contention that the District had
opened the advertising portions to indiscriminate use by the public be-
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1135.
155. Id.
156. See id. ("[Even if the School] was motivated by a disagreement with the content of [his]
speech, it does not follow that a First Amendment violation necessarily occurred.").
157. Id. at 1135-36.
158. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 820, 821.
160. Id. at 821.
161. Id. at 820.
162. Id. at 821.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 830.
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cause "the school district here showed an affirmative intent to retain edi-
torial control and responsibility over all publications and advertising
disseminated under the auspices of its schools."' 65 Further, the court
ruled that the District's practice of not publishing controversial adver-
tisements was reasonable, viewpoint neutral, and constitutional. 66 Fi-
nally, the court rejected Planned Parenthood's argument that Hazelwood
applies only to student speech and not to other private speech that occurs
in a school setting. 167 "Although the facts of Hazelwood dealt with stu-
dent expression," stated the court, "its rationale was not so limited. The
Court . . . remarked on a school's ability to regulate reasonably the
speech not only of students, but also 'teachers, and other members of the
school community.',' 68 Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel upheld the Dis-
trict' s decision to exclude Planned Parenthood's advertisements.1
69
c. Eleventh Circuit: Searcey v. Harris
70
i. Facts
The Atlanta School Board ("the School Board") created a "Career
Day" program to allow community members to come to schools to give
students information about career opportunities and the skills required
for particular jobs. 17 1 In February 1983, the Atlanta Peace Alliance
("APA") requested permission from several high schools to distribute
information in the offices of guidance counselors, run advertisements in
school newspapers, and participate in school Career Days. 1 2 The APA
was a local organization devoted to promoting peaceful, non-military
solutions to conflicts. 73 The School Board ultimately denied the APA
access to the schools because of the APA's controversial viewpoint to-
wards the military, 174 and the APA then brought a claim charging that the
School District infringed on the free speech rights of its members. 75 The
district court found for the APA and granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the School Board from denying the APA the same access
afforded to military recruiters.
76 The School Board appealed. 1
77
165. Id. at 824.
166. Id. at 829-30.
167. Id. at 827.
168. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
169. Id. at 830.
170. 888 F.2d 1314 (11 th Cir. 1989).
171. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1316.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1318.
174. Id. at 1323, 1326.
175. Id. at 1316.
176. Id. at 1316-17.
177. Id. at 1315.
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ii. Decision
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling but modified parts of the School Board's regulations for Career
Days. 178 The court agreed that the Career Day program was a nonpublic
forum, and, thus, the School Board could impose some restrictions on
who may speak. 179 However, the court also noted that in order to be con-
stitutional, the restrictions had to be both reasonable and viewpoint neu-
tral. 180 The court concluded that a regulation that precluded an organiza-
tion from participating in a Career Day event when the organization's
objective was to dissuade students from entering a particular occupation
or from partaking of a particular educational opportunity was neither
reasonable nor viewpoint neutral.' 81 The court found that it was reason-
able to preclude an organization from denigrating opportunities presented
by another group.1 82 It was, however, unreasonable to "prohibit a group
from presenting negative factual information about the disadvantages of
specific job opportunities because such information is useful to students
making decisions about careers.' 83 Further, allowing one group to pre-
sent the advantages of a career, while forbidding another group to proffer
information about the disadvantages of the same career, was viewpoint
discrimination.184 Specifically, the court stated "the School Board denied
plaintiffs access to the forum for the reason of plaintiffs' viewpoint to-
wards the military."'' 85 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling. 1
86
C. Analysis
This survey's limited review of decisions by federal circuit courts of
appeals that involved the school-sponsored speech exception indicates
that the circuit courts have honored Hazelwood's directive to defer to
school authorities about expression in the schools. The circuits disagree,
however, about whether the schools must make viewpoint neutral deci-
sions about speech. 87 The Tenth Circuit takes a very unambiguous posi-
tion on the issue. In Fleming, the court took the position that "Hazelwood
allows educators to make viewpoint-based decisions about school-
sponsored speech.' ' 188 As Searcey'89 and Planned Parenthood'9" demon-
178. Id. at 1325-26.
179. Id. at 1320.
180. id. at 1319.
181. Id. at 1322-24.
182. Id. at 1324.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1326.
186. Id.
187. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926 ("Our sister circuits have split over whether Hazelwood
requires that schools' restrictions on school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral.").
188. Id.
189. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1324.
190. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 830.
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strate, however, some circuits still adhere to the notion that restrictions
on school-sponsored speech must be content neutral, or else they violate
the First Amendment.
Although the case involved controversial issues of religious expres-
sion in a public place, the Tenth Circuit panel did not analyze the facts of
Fleming under the Establishment Clause.' 91 To some proponents of a
strong separation between church and state, the court might appear to
have abdicated its constitutional duty to enforce the Establishment
Clause. The plaintiffs, however, did not appeal the district court's judg-
ment in favor of the School District on its Establishment Clause claim, 192
and, thus, the court was not bound to address the issue. 193 Still, it is inter-
esting that the court did not explicitly raise any concerns that posting
several clearly Christian messages on the wall of a publicly funded
school might violate the strictures of the Establishment Clause.
Importantly, the decision did mandate that the tiles containing reli-
gious expressions be removed from the walls of the school. 194 This com-
mand hews to the long-standing view that, as Thomas Jefferson wrote so
long ago, a solid "wall" should be erected between church and state.
95
This restrictive perspective on the proper relationship between religion
and government has long been referred to as a "separationist" position.,
96
According to this view, the separation is crucial to protecting individual
freedoms of religion. 97 If the government closely allied itself with reli-
gious views, there would be "inevitable coercion" to participate in the
government's chosen religion. 198 Thus, according to the separationists,
the strict division is necessary to ensure the protections guaranteed by the
191. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 n. 1.
192. Id.
193. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.4, at 53-54
(2d ed. 2002) (noting the requirement that, for a case to be heard by a federal court, there must be an
actual dispute between two parties, and that "it is firmly established that federal courts cannot issue
advisory opinions").
194. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 921, 933 (stating that some of the tiles in question were clearly
religious in nature and that the public school district's restriction of these religious symbols was
proper).
195. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 303-04 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. Adhering to this
expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall
see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man
all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Id.
196. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 1149-50.
197. Id. at 1150.
198. Id.
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Constitution.' 99 While the court in Fleming did not expressly affirm the
separationist theory, its reasoning appears to support that perspective.
The court stated that in the public school setting, school officials have a
"legitimate interest in avoiding religious controversy and disruption re-
sulting from the posting of religious speech. ' 2°
In an era replete with various horrific school shootings, the tragedy
at Columbine High School represents the worst: in a few hours, the
community in which the school sat lost fourteen students and one faculty
member. 20 That sobering fact might have been reason enough for the
School District and the court to defer to the wishes of the grieving fami-
lies and friends who lost loved ones in the killing and agree to permit the
attachment of the controversial tiles to the hallway walls of the school.
Instead, the court applied free speech precedent and made its determina-
tion by applying Hazelwood.2 °2 When the court held that the Jefferson
County School District did have the right to control what would be per-
manently affixed to its walls,203 it gave another victory to those who be-
lieve that it is school officials, in "their role as 'a principle instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment[,], 204 who should be given the most prominent voice in determin-
ing what is and is not proper for the school environment.
II. RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS ON PUBLIC PROPERTY AND THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN SUMMUM V. CITY OF OGDEN°5
A. The Legal Background: The Lemon Test and Subsequent Develop-
ments
For the past three decades, cases involving religious expression on
public property have primarily involved Establishment Clause disputes
and have been governed largely by the landmark United States Supreme
Court decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 °6 In that case, the legislatures of
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania had both enacted statutory programs
providing for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by private church-
related schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other educational ma-
terials for certain secular subjects. 20 7 The plaintiffs in the case, citizen-
taxpayers from both states, claimed that the provisions were unconstitu-
tional because they violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
199. Id.
200. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 933.
201. Id. at 920.
202. See id. at 924.
203. Id. at 934.
204. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
205. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
207. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
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of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. °8
Although the Court recognized that its precedent did "not call for
total separation between church and state[,] ''2°9 it nonetheless held that
both statutes were unconstitutional and violated the First Amendment's
religion clauses. 210 The Court announced a three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether the government has impermissibly encroached onto private
religious affairs in a given case.2 1 Under the test, for a statute or state
practice to be permissible: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its prin-
cipal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3)
it must not create "excessive government entanglement with religion. 212
The Lemon test, as it came to be known, was the preeminent test in
Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s. 13 For all its use, however, the test never elicited enthusiastic
and widespread support from the Court.1 4 Indeed, it drew much criticism
from commentators.1 5 Perhaps as a result of this criticism and lack of
consensus within the Court following the formulation of the Lemon test,
the Court has since turned to several other methods of Establishment
Clause analysis, including a "historical practice" inquiry216 and a "coer-
cion" test.217 In addition, the "endorsement" test that was espoused by
Justice O'Connor is perhaps the approach that has been the most favored
in recent years. 18 Under the endorsement test, a government statute or
action violates the Establishment Clause if "a reasonable observer would
conclude that official activity 'sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community.'
219
The endorsement test has gained particular significance resolving
disputes about religious displays on public property. Two cases decided
208. Id. at 606.
209. Id. at 614; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("Nor does the Constitution
require complete separation of church and state").
210. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 625.
211. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as a Historical Docu-
ment in Public Schools, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1025-26 (2002).
212. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
213. See Dustin Zander, Note, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments on the Courtroom
Wall: Judge Roy Moore and the Constitution, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371, 372 (1999).
214. See Choper, supra note 3, at 1721 (observing that "[t]he Court was never willing to truly
abide by the Lemon Test").
215. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Stuck With a Lemon: A New Test For Establish-
ment Clause Cases Would Help Ease Current Confusion, 83 A.B.A. J. 46 (1997) (criticizing the
Lemon test); Choper, supra note 3, at 1720-21 (criticizing the Lemon test).
216. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 211, at 1028-29.
217. See Choper, supra note 3, at 1723-24.
218. Id. at 1723.
219. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688).
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by the Court in the 1980S220 and one decided in the 1990s22' exemplify
the drift away from the controversial Lemon test towards the more coher-
ent endorsement inquiry.
In Lynch v. Donnelly,222 the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
erected a Christmas display in a city shopping area that included a creche
depicting the Nativity scene.223 Residents of the city and members of the
local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") brought
an action in federal district court alleging a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.224 The Court applied the Lemon test, inquired into historical
practices, and ruled that there was not a violation.225 The Court cited "an
unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least
1789.''226 It determined that in the context of the holiday season and the
traditions of the Christmas celebration, there was "insufficient evidence
to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surrepti-
tious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message.,, 227 It is important to note that the Court
made it clear that the Lemon test was not absolutely mandatory, stating,
"[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to
any single test or criterion in this sensitive area., 228 Indeed, in finding the
creche a permissible holiday display, both the majority,229 and more
markedly, Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion, incorporated an
endorsement analysis.23°
Five years later the Supreme Court decided County of Allegheny v.
ACLU.231 There, the Allegheny County government in the State of Penn-
sylvania allowed a Roman Catholic group to erect a creche on the grand
staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.232 Similarly, the City and
County of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, agreed to permit an 18-foot Chanu-
220. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a creche
displayed on the grand staircase of a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but that a
menorah placed outside a city-county building did not); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (holding that a city's
inclusion of a creche depicting a Christian Nativity scene in a holiday display did not violate the
Establishment Clause).
221. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (hold-
ing that a municipal board's agreement to authorize the placement of a cross on public grounds at the
request of the Ku Klux Klan did not violate the Establishment Clause).
222. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
223. Lemon, 465 U.S. at 671.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 672, 687.
226. Id. at 674.
227. Id. at 680.
228. Id. at 679.
229. Id. at 681-82 (asserting that displaying the creche did not benefit or endorse religion more
that the actions that the Court previously upheld as not violating the Establishment Clause).
230. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Focusing on institutional entanglement and on
endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.").
231. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
232. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579-80.
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kah menorah to be erected alongside a Christmas tree outside of the City-
County Building that the City and County owned jointly.233 Local resi-
dents and members of the local chapter of the ACLU combined to file
suit against the City and County, alleging that they had violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.234
In a divided opinion,235 the Court ruled that the creche was a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause, but the menorah was constitutionally
permissible.236 The majority opinion noted that the endorsement analysis
that Justice O'Connor presented in her concurring opinion in Lynch pro-
vided "a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of
religious symbols. 237 Thus, the majority decided the issue based on an
endorsement inquiry238 and found that the creche, standing alone on the
grand staircase, conveyed a clear religious message 239 that a reasonable
observer would believe the County was endorsing.240 Applying the same
principles to the menorah, the majority concluded that the menorah,
when placed next to a Christmas tree and a mayor's sign celebrating lib-
erty, was more a salute to diverse secular holiday traditions than a mes-
sage about the Jewish faith.24' Consequently, the overall secular nature of
the display in question made it highly unlikely that residents of Pitts-
burgh would believe that it was an endorsement of either the Jewish or
Christian religions.242 "On the contrary," stated the majority, "for pur-
poses of the Establishment Clause, the city's overall display must be
understood as conveying the city's secular recognition of different tradi-
tions for celebrating the winter-holiday season.,
243
By contrast, in a dissenting opinion, four justices applied a "coer-
cion" analysis and found that placing the creche in the Allegheny County
Courthouse was not in violation of the Establishment Clause.244 In so
doing, the justices expressly questioned the propriety of disregarding
Court precedent in favor of the newer endorsement test.245 Instead, the
dissent argued for an approach that would recognize "the tradition of
233. Id. at 582, 587..
234. Id. at 587-88.
235. Id. at 578; see Abdel-Monem, supra note 211, at 1032 (stating that Justice Blackmun
wrote the divided decision).
236. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
237. Id. at 595.
238. Id. at 597.
239. Id. at 598 ("Nothing in the context of the display detracts from the creche's religious
message.").
240. Id. at 601-02 ("[Allegheny County has] chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has
the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ. ...
nothing more is required to demonstrate a violation of the Establishment Clause.").
241. Id. at 616-20.
242. Id. at 620.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[The endorsement test is] a recent, and in my view
most unwelcome, addition to our tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
government accommodation and acknowledgment of religion that has
marked our history from the beginning. ''246 Through this approach, gov-
ernment would receive more "latitude in recognizing and accommodat-
ing the central role religion plays in our society. 247 Inherent in the dis-
sent's approach is an aversion to what the dissent refers to as "an unjusti-
fied hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and
our precedents. ' 48 The dissent asserted that "[g]overnment policies of
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an ac-
cepted part of our political and cultural heritage." 249 Above all, though,
the "accommodationist" approach urged by the dissent is grounded pri-
marily on the belief that the presence of state coercion should be the
governing factor in identifying violations of the Establishment Clause. 250
The dissent, therefore, found the creche in Allegheny to be a permissible
religious holiday display.25'
Finally, in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,252 a
municipal advisory board ("the Board") responsible for regulating access
to a state-owned plaza surrounding the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio,
refused to allow the Ohio Ku Klux Klan ("the Klan") to erect a cross
within the confines of the plaza. 3 A federal district court issued an in-
junction mandating that the Board give the Klan access to the grounds.254
255The Board gave the required permission but appealed the decision.
The Court held that placing the cross in the public plaza was not a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause and, thus, the Board could not deny the
Klan access. 6 While seven justices joined the opinion of the Court, two
justices filed separate dissenting opinions. 7
According to the majority, religious expression does not offend the
Establishment Clause if (1) it is purely private expression, and (2) it "oc-
curs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and
open to all on equal terms. 25 8 According to the plurality opinion, be-
cause the Klan's cross was a purely private expression, and because the
Board's policy regarding displays on the plaza grounds was neutral, there
could be no violation of the Establishment Clause. 259 The majority con-
cluded that this was so even if the Board's policy caused some incidental
246. Id. at 663 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise").
251. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
252. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
253. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 758.
254. Id. at 759.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 770.
257. See id. at 756 (Both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions.).
258. Id. at 770. See Dagley, supra note 11, at 5, for a summary of public forum analysis.
259. See Choper, supra note 3, at 1737.
[Vol. 80:3
2003] RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC GROUNDS 677
benefit to religion, and even if some observers might perceive a govern-
260mental endorsement of religion. In ruling in favor of the Klan, the plu-
rality effectively carved out an exception to the endorsement test and
created its own per se rule.261
Despite this newly articulated per se rule, however, five of the jus-
tices still supported the endorsement test.262 Thus, even though the ac-
commodationists on the Court prevailed, as Professor Jesse H. Choper
has put it, "[T]hey lost the war of determining a replacement for the
Lemon test. The more separationist position of endorsement now has
garnered five votes, and that would seem to be the prevailing test for
alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, at least until the next Jus-
tice comes along.
263
B. Circuit Courts Addressing Religious Displays on Public Property
1. Tenth Circuit: Summum v. City of Ogden
264
a. Facts
In 1966, the City of Ogden, Utah ("the City"), erected a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on a lawn outside the City's mu-
nicipal building.265 The monument was given to the City by a community
group called the Fraternal Order of Eagles.266 Along with the text of the
Ten Commandments, the monument was also inscribed with two Stars of
David, the Greek letters "Chi" and "Rho," an "all-seeing eye," a pyra-
mid, an eagle, an American flag, some Phoenician letters, and a depiction
of a scroll containing the message, "Presented to the City of Ogden and
Weber County, Utah, by Utah State Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles
1966. "267 Placed alongside the monument on the lawn were a police offi-
cer memorial and a sister city tree and plaque. 68 Additionally, various
historical markers were placed in an area set apart from the monument.269
260. Id.
261. See id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ( "I see no necessity to carve out, as the plurality
opinion would today, an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum context."); id. at 784
(Souter, J., concurring) ("This per se rule would be an exception to the endorsement test, not previ-
ously recognized and out of square with our precedents.").
262. Pinene, 515 U.S. at 762-69; Id. at 772-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 783-84
(Souter, J., concurring); Id. at 797, 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Choper, supra note 3, at 1737-38 (stating that Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg wrote that any government endorsement of religion violates the
Establishment Clause).
263. Choper, supra note 3, at 1738.
264. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
265. Summum, 297 F.3d at 997.
266. Id. at 998.
267. Id. at 997-98.
268. Id. at 998.
269. Id.
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Summum, a religious group formed in 1975 and chartered in Utah,
sought to have the City remove the monument.270 The City refused.27'
Summum then requested that the City agree to place a privately funded
monument inscribed with the group's "Seven Principles" in the same
area as the Ten Commandments monument.272 Again, the City refused.273
Summum then brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of
its First Amendment rights under the Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses.274 The district court ruled that there was no Establishment
Clause violation because the Ten Commandments monument was largely
secular in nature.275 It found that the City adopted the speech located on
276the permanent monuments on the lawn as its own. Consequently, the
court thought that granting Summum's request would be tantamount to
277allowing a group to dictate what the City would or would not express.
In addition, the court held that the City did not violate the Free Speech
Clause.278 Summum appealed the trial court's decision on its free speech
claim to the Tenth Circuit.
279
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its discussion by noting
that at oral argument, Summum's counsel conceded that, absent en banc
reconsideration of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anderson v. Salt Lake
City Corp.,2 80 the court could not reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the City regarding the Establishment
Clause claim. 281 However, the court also suggested in a footnote of its
opinion that Summum's concession was perhaps not wise.282 First, ac-
cording to the court, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Stone v.
Graham,283 as well as the Tenth Circuit's own ruling in Summum v. Cal-
284 285laghan,2 4 cast some doubt on "the health" of the Anderson decision.
Secondly, the court noted that the ruling in Anderson depended upon an





274. Id. at 999.





280. 475 F.2d 29, 30-34 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a municipality did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when it permitted a monument of the Ten Commandments to be erected as part of a
passive, secular display on public grounds).
281. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000.
282. Id. at 1000 n.3.
283. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that public schools could not post the Ten Commandments in
classrooms because of their unambiguous religious nature).
284. 130 F.3d 906, 913 n.8. (10th Cir. 1997) ("Our decision in Anderson has been called into
question by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham").
285. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000 n.3.
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the Ten Commandments monument to be posted, and "[t]he fact that the
municipality at issue in Anderson (Salt Lake City) maintained a proper
purpose in displaying that municipality's Ten Commandments Monu-
ment does not establish that the City of Ogden maintained such a proper
purpose.,
286
Once the court dispensed with the Establishment Clause issue, it
turned to the remaining free speech issue.287 The court first made a public
forum inquiry288 and determined that the permanent monuments on the
lawn of the municipal building were nonpublic forums. 289 Therefore, the
municipality could restrict access to the forum as long as the restrictions
were reasonable and viewpoint neutral.29° In support of its contention
that these two conditions had been satisfied, the City presented two dis-
tinct arguments. 29' First, the City stated that it had adopted the speech on
the Ten Commandments monument as its own.292 Thus, the City argued
that it had eliminated any form of private speech in the forum and could
not be seen as discriminating between any potential private speakers.293
Alternatively, the City argued that even if it had discriminated by allow-
ing the Ten Commandments monument and simultaneously rejecting the
Summum monument, such discrimination was reasonable and viewpoint
neutral because of the heightened historical relevance of the Ten Com-
mandments to the community as compared to that of the Summum
group's Seven Principles.294
The court rejected these two arguments in turn. 2 95 First, the court
analyzed the City's claim that it had adopted the speech 29 6 by applying
the four factors adopted in Wells v. City and County of Denver.297 The
four factors articulated in Wells were: (1) whether the central purpose of
the sign or monument in question was to promote the views of the mu-
nicipality; (2) whether the municipality exercised editorial control over
the content of the sign or monument; (3) whether the literal speaker was
an employee of the municipality; and (4) whether the ultimate responsi-
286. Id. Thus, unlike the Fleming Court, the court in Summum at least explicitly referred (albeit
in a footnote) to the potential for an Establishment Clause violation on the part of the government if
it accepted the religious expression onto public property. See id.; Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch.
Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 995,920 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002).
287. Id.
288. See Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
289. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1002.
290. Id. at 1002-03.




295. Id. at 1004, 1006.
296. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1004.
297. 257 F.3d 1132, 1140-42 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court's ruling that upheld a
city's refusal to post a Winter Solstice sign devoted to atheist beliefs within the city's fenced-off
winter holiday display).
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bility for determining the content of the sign or monument rested with
the municipality.298
Applying these four factors to the instant case, the court determined
that the City might have satisfied only the fourth.299 The central purpose
of the monument was to advance the views of the Fraternal Order of Ea-
gles, not the City.300 Furthermore, the City never exercised any editorial
control over the monument.3°1 Rather, the Eagles had controlled what
was expressed and had given a finished product to the City.30 2 The court
also believed that the Eagles were the true speakers of the monument's
message, notwithstanding the fact that the monument stood on municipal
grounds. 30 3 Lastly, though, the court observed that "[a]rguably .... the
City may be charged with ultimate responsibility for the content of the
Monument."
3°4
In considering whether the City had adopted the speech as its own,
the court also attributed great importance to the "after-the-fact nature of
the City of Ogden's effort to claim adoption of that speech.' 30 5 The court
alluded to the Supreme Court's concern over "post hoc rationalizations
[that] may obscure viewpoint discrimination." 30 6 The court felt that the
City of Ogden had not shown any pre-litigation evidence of its adoption
of the speech in question.30 7 Thus, in view of the four factors from Wells
and the "the caselaw's particular concern for post hoc rationalizations in
the Free Speech context," the court concluded that "the speech repre-
sented by the Ten Commandments Monument represents the speech of
the Eagles rather than that of the City of Ogden. 30
The court then turned to the City's historical relevance justifica-
tion.3 9 In ruling against the City on this claim, the court did not conclude
that "a municipality may never maintain a nonpublic forum to which
access is controlled based upon 'historical relevance' to the given com-
munity. ' '3 Rather, the court decided that the City could not base its ac-
tions on such a claim because it had failed to utilize sufficient safeguards
to ensure that the historical relevance justification did not become merely
a "post hoc facade for viewpoint discrimination.'
31'
298. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1004.
299. Id. at 1004-05.
300. Id. at 1004.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1004-05.
304. Id. at 1005.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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In order to show that its historical relevance justification did have a
sound basis, the City had to show either an official written policy sup-
porting such a justification or a "well-established practice" of utilizing
the historical relevance criterion.312 On both counts, the court concluded,
the City failed to provide sufficient evidence supporting its position.313
Thus, in its failure to show any official policy allowing the simultaneous
approval of the Ten Commandments monument and the rejection of the
Summum monument, the City had "unreasonably, and in violation of the
Free Speech Clause, risked viewpoint discrimination in the relevant fo-
rum.,
314
The court concluded its discussion by addressing the City's defense
that allowing Summum to erect a monument on municipal grounds
would violate the Establishment Clause.315 Interestingly, in analyzing this
Establishment Clause claim, the court applied elements of two of the
three major Establishment Clause inquiries: the Lemon test, and the "co-
ercion" analysis.316 The court concluded that the City would not violate
the Establishment Clause by erecting the Summum monument.317 Con-
trary to what the City argued, the purpose inquiry under the Lemon test
focuses on the government's purpose for allowing the speech in question,
not on the religious entity's purpose in requesting the expression. 318 In
the instant case, there was no evidence presented that pointed to any po-
tential for an improper purpose on the part of the City if it allowed Sum-
mum to erect its monument. 319 Rather, the evidence in the record showed
that the only viable motive that could be attributed to the City if it hon-
ored Summum's request would be "a concern for equal access., 320 The
City, rather ironically, argued that erecting the Summum monument
would cause a reasonable observer to conclude that the City endorsed the
Summum religion.321 The court reached the contrary conclusion and said
that a reasonable observer would actually "note the fact that the lawn of
the municipal building contains a diverse array of monuments, some
from a secular and some from a sectarian perspective.
', 322
Thus, the court held that there was, in fact, a violation of the Free
Speech Clause because the City's restriction of Summum's expression
312. Id. at 1007.
313. Id. at 1008-09.
314. Id. at 1009.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 1009-10.
317. Id. at 1010.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1011.
320. Id.
321. Id. ("The City['s argument was] ... somewhat ironic.., in light of the City's simultane-
ous insistence that the display of the Ten Commandments Monument alone does not violate the
Establishment Clause").
322. Id.
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was not reasonable or viewpoint neutral.323 Accordingly, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the City regarding the free speech claim.324
2. Other Circuits




In 1993, the Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority ("the
Building Authority") in Indianapolis, Indiana, refused to allow the plain-
tiffs, Rabbi Abraham Grossbaum and Lubavitch of Indiana, Inc., an Or-
thodox Jewish organization, to erect a menorah in the lobby of the Indi-
anapolis City-County Building during the Jewish holiday of Chanu-
kah.326 For many years prior to this denial, the Building Authority had
given the plaintiffs permission to erect a menorah.327 However, because
of complaints that the menorah's presence violated the Establishment
Clause, the Building Authority issued a new policy in 1993 disallowing
the display of "seasonal religious symbols" in the City-County Build-
ing.328 This new policy initially included the prohibition of Christmas
trees, but after the Building Authority was informed by its legal counsel
that courts traditionally view Christmas trees as conveying secular rather
than religious messages, the Building Authority decided to have Christ-
mas trees erected in the lobby during the holiday season.329 The plain-
tiffs, alleging that the Building Authority was engaging in content and
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, brought
suit in district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.330 The dis-
trict court ruled against the plaintiffs and held that the Building Authority
had not exhibited viewpoint discrimination when it simultaneously al-
lowed Christmas trees and rejected the menorah. 331 The plaintiffs then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
332
ii. Decision
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first noted that the forum in
question was nonpublic and, as such, government restrictions on speech
were permissible only if they were reasonable and viewpoint neutral.333
323. See id. at 1011-12.
324. Id. at 1012.
325. 163 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 1995).
326. Grossbaum, 163 F.3d at 582.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 583.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 584.
332. Id. at 582.
333. Id. at 587.
2003] RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC GROUNDS 683
In a nonpublic forum context, the government violates First Amendment
free speech rights and the rule that requires viewpoint neutrality when it
"denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he es-
pouses on an otherwise includible subject., 334 The court, therefore, had
to decide whether the holiday season was an "includible subject" for
discussion in the lobby and the religious display just one particular view-
point, or whether religious displays in general were a subject that could
be properly excluded as part of a reasonable and viewpoint neutral re-
striction.335
The Court concluded that the Building Authority's policy that ex-
cluded the menorah "was constructed to prevent one thing: seasonal
holiday displays of a religious character.",336 Because the Building Au-
thority permitted other groups with non-religious messages to apply for
space within the City-County Building lobby, and because the court be-
lieved that religious material was a viewpoint and not a general subject in
this context, the court found that the Building Authority was unconstitu-
tionally discriminating based on the plaintiffs perspective.337 The court
held that "the prohibition of the menorah's message because of its reli-
gious perspective was unconstitutional under the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause."
338
b. Seventh Circuit: Books v. City of Elkhart
3 39
i. Facts
The City of Elkhart, Minnesota ("the City"), erected a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on a lawn in front of the City's
Municipal Building.34° The monument was a gift from the Fraternal Or-
der of Eagles and was placed on the lawn near a monument that honored
Revolutionary War soldiers buried in Elkhart County and another that
celebrated freedom. 341 William Books and Michael Suetkamp, residents
of the City, brought suit in federal district court alleging that the City
violated the Establishment Clause. 42 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City and the plaintiffs then appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit.4 3
334. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)).
335. Id. at 588.
336. Id. at 590.
337. Id. at 591-92.
338. Id. at 592.
339. 235 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 2000).
340. Books, 235 F.3d at 295.
341. Id. at 295-96.
342. Id. at 294.
343. Id.
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ii. Decision
In an opinion written by the same judge who authored the Gross-
baum opinion, 344 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Ten
Commandments monument did violate the Establishment Clause, and
thus, the district court's decision had to be reversed.345 Citing the Lemon
test as "the prevailing analytical tool for the analysis of Establishment
Clause claims, ' 34 the court determined that the City had failed the first
and second prongs of the test.347 In ruling against the City, the court ex-
pressed a distrust of the City's contention that the purpose of the monu-
ment was largely secular.348 Instead, the court found that "the purpose in
displaying this monument was to promote religious ideals. 349
C. Analysis
As in the Fleming decision, the dispute that the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed in Summum did not involve the Establishment
Clause.35° Counsel for Summum conceded in oral argument that, absent
the overturning of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anderson, precedent
mandated that the City prevail on its motion for summary judgment re-
garding the Establishment Clause claim, and the court declined to pursue
the matter. 351 However, the court questioned whether Summum's conces-
sion was wise.352 Based on the Supreme Court's strongly worded asser-
tion that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact,, 353 Summum may have had
sufficient justification to argue that the Ten Commandments, under any
test, are inherently religious in nature and displaying them on govern-
ment property entails impermissible entanglements between religion and
government. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's divided opinion in
Pinette,354 in which the plurality opinion afforded government entities
substantially more leeway in allowing private religious expression on
public property,355 could stand as a significant and recent obstacle to Es-
tablishment Clause claims.
Regardless, in the end, Summum was, like Fleming, decided on free
speech grounds.356 The basis for the decision was the notion that, in a
344. See id. at 294; Grossbaum, 63 F.3d at 582.
345. Books, 235 F.3d at 304, 307, 308.
346. Id. at 301.
347. Id. at 304, 307.
348. See id. at 304.
349. Id.
350. See Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 n. 1.
351. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000.
352. Id. at 1000 n.3.
353. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
354. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 756.
355. See id. at 770.
356. See Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934.
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nonpublic forum, the government can only restrict expression if the re-
striction is reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum and is view-
point neutral.357 Included in the reasoning behind the decision, however,
is the more recent view that, as the Supreme Court declared in Pinette,
"private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is
as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private ex-
pression.,
358
Thus, Summum represents the more inclusive and accommodationist
view of government's proper role in regulating and recognizing religious
expression. According to the approach, religious beliefs should be ac-
corded the same treatment as nonreligious beliefs and the government
may acknowledge them in a manner that does not offend the principles of
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.35 9 As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky writes, "[U]nder the accommodation approach the govern-
ment violates the establishment clause only if it literally establishes a
church, coerces religious participation, or favors one religion over oth-
ers." 36° Moreover, according to Chemerinsky, the accommodationist per-
spective argues that the Supreme Court "should interpret the establish-
ment clause to recognize the importance of religion in society and ac-
commodate its presence in government.9
361
In ruling that the City could not refuse to include Summum's
monument on municipal grounds while displaying the Ten Command-
ments,362 the Tenth Circuit seems to adhere closely to the principles sup-
porting the nascent movement to recognize the prominent role of religion
in the nation's culture and governance.363 Even though the expression in
question was religious in nature, and even though certain exceptions to
the right to free speech exist in First Amendment jurisprudence, the court
declared that the monument proposed by Summum "does not fall within
these limited exceptions and thus constitutes protected speech. 36
CONCLUSION
The history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been marked
by a tension created by the interplay of two competing values: the sepa-
ration of church and state and government neutrality towards religion.365
Heightening this tension is the enduring conflict between the Establish-
357. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1002-03.
358. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760.
359. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, § 12.2.1, at 1154.
360. Id. at 1153.
361. Id.
362. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1011.
363. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
364. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1001.
365. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 1071, 1071 (2002).
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ment Clause itself and the Free Exercise Clause.366 As the First Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington,
367
"[T]he Establishment Clause pulls in the direction of separating church
and state, while the Free Exercise Clause pushes in the direction of per-
mitting the unfettered expression of religious doctrine. 36 8 Government
actions designed to facilitate religious expression may be challenged as
"impermissible establishments," while government restrictions of relig-
ion may be seen as violating "the free exercise thereof., 369 The Tenth
Circuit's decisions in Fleming and Summum reflect the difficulties in-
volved in the government's attempt to avoid these scenarios. In one case,
the court was clearly inclined to keep religious content off the walls of a
public school and, thus, avoid any perceived governmental endorse-
370ment. In the other, the court looked to other values such as equal
treatment and historical tradition in finding that an out-of-the-mainstream
church had a right to voice its beliefs alongside more prominent sects on
public property.37t These two results embody two distinct visions of the
role of religion in our society and government, and their examples will
probably be followed for years to come as the republic strives to find a
balance between the religious and the secular and between faith and sci-
ence. Considering the historical volatility of such struggles, perhaps the
decision in Fleming was the better result, as its reasoning left faith and
religious expression to what might be their more appropriate settings-
our nation's houses of worship.
Sean Moynihan*
366. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, § 12.1.1, at 1140.
367. 272 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a town's ban on unattended structures on a town
green did not infringe on a religious organization's rights of free speech).
368. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d at 35.
369. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 1140.
370. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 930, 933 (10th Cir. 2002)
("The presence of permanently affixed tiles on the walls implicates the school's approval of those
tiles" and public schools have a "legitimate interest in avoiding religious controversy and disruption
resulting from the posting of religious speech.").
371. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1008-09, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002) (The court
found no discernible city policy of accepting monuments based on historical relevance and con-
cluded that "[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment compels the City of Ogden to treat
with equal dignity speech from divergent religious perspectives.").
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